SDM’s New Year’s Resolution
by SDM
SDM is no fan of cynical politicians. What constitutes cynical behavior in SDM’s world is when a political figure intentionally misleads the public by twisting facts – or ignoring them altogether – knowing that the general public doesn’t know the truth.
Let SDM give you a current example. Some national political figures insist that extending the Bush-era tax cuts for 98% of taxpayers will resolve the “fiscal cliff.” Of course, the truth is that if this wish were granted, the result would be trillion-dollar deficits for as far as the eye can see; yet most regular folks are either too busy or too ill-informed to understand this basic law of math. Thus, the political figures get away with the ploy, knowing that all they are doing is borrowing from the future.
Certainly, this type of cynical manipulation is nothing new. What SDM feels to be new is how those who challenge such cynical behavior react to it. SDM has noticed that instead of reacting with intellectual outrage, sometimes even the lowly SDM reacts with a personalized outrage – a dislike of the person doing the cynical act, occasionally manifested in a blog post.
Sure, some may say that a blast from SDM’s pen is exactly what the cynical politician deserves. Fight fire with fire, they might argue.
But the problem with fighting cynicism with aggression or, worse, in kind, is that doing so further coarsens an already too coarse public dialogue.
Therefore, SDM resolves that in 2013 this blog will maintain a laser-like focus on argumentation based on facts. This blog will concentrate on correcting misleading statements and avoid the temptation to wallow in personalized observations about the speaker’s faults.
But, there is a caveat: Politicians use their various platforms to verbally express their individualized political philosophies. For example, Palmetto Bay’s Mayor often lectures speakers on her understanding of village laws and procedures. She often stumbles on her words and misstates those laws and procedures. SDM will continue to point out those mistakes, along with those of her colleagues, because someone must.
From all of us at SDM, happy holidays and our best wishes for a wonderful New Year.
Publication Note: SDM will be publishing only occasionally until after the first of the year. Even curmudgeon’s deserve a little time off.
Sounds like a great plan and we look forward to having you explain what the village means by their comments….hopefully more and more people will tune into SDM and learn more about the future of our village….
All the best to you and your family whomever you are…and all the best in life in health and hopefully peace in our nation, world and our village….that would be the best gift for everyone…
Could anything produce more cynicism than the response from the Attorney General’s office to Eve Boutsis’ letter seeking advice on whether to produce shade transcripts.
An informal opinion was issued to the Village of Palmetto Bay on December 13, 2012. A copy of that opinion is attached. Thank you for contacting the Attorney General’s Office.
Joslyn Wilson
Assistant Attorney General
State of Florida
Office of the Attorney General
Informal Legal Opinion
Number: INFORMAL
Date: December 13, 2012
Subject: Sunshine/Public Records, conclusion of litigation
Ms. Eve A. Boutsis
Office of the Village Attorney
18001 Old Cutler Road, Suite 533
Miami, Florida 33157-6416
Dear Ms. Boutsis:
As Village Attorney for the Village of Palmetto Bay, you have requested this office’s assistance in addressing two questions relating to statutory exemptions from the Government in the Sunshine Law and the Public Records Law.
According to your letter, the Village of Palmetto Bay has been involved in protracted litigation over a land use related matter since 2008. You have provided extensive background details on six separate actions, some of which are appeals of lower court decisions. All six actions involve the same parties and the same actions by the parties. As described in your
letter:
“The two civil actions (Cases 2 and 5) remain in litigation. The matters have not been noticed for trial. The two matters have been consolidated before the same judge solely for discovery purposes. Again, the operative facts of the six Cases are the same operative facts as contained in four appeals (Cases 1, 3, 4, and 6). The parties remain in motion practice and possible appeals as it relates to appellate actions listed as Cases 4 and 6. Cases 4 and 6 derive out of Cases 1 and 3. The mandates have issued in these two actions but there are pending motions relating to fees and costs, and possible appeals relating to these motions.”
You advise that several of the cases in which the Village of Palmetto Bay is a party are appeals of lower court decisions and question whether the transcript of a meeting held to discuss settlement negotiations or strategy sessions related to litigation expenditures must be made public while the appeal is pursued. You, therefore, ask whether the provision in section 286.011(8)(e), Florida Statutes, that a transcript is a public record “upon conclusion of the litigation” would include the appellate phase of litigation. You also ask whether the language “the conclusion of the litigation” in section 119.071(1)(d), Florida Statutes, would extend the exemption created by that section through the prosecution of an appeal.
While this office is not a fact finder and therefore cannot resolve mixed questions of law and fact as to the status of the six cases in question, I offer the following general comments regarding the above exemptions in an effort to be of assistance.
Government in the Sunshine Law
While discussions between a public board and its attorney are generally subject to the requirements of section 286.011, Florida Statutes, the Government in the Sunshine Law,[1] section 286.011(8), Florida Statutes, provides a limited exemption for certain discussions of pending litigation between a public board and its attorney. Subsection (8) states:
“Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1), any board or commission of any state agency or authority or any agency or authority of any county, municipal corporation, or political subdivision, and the chief administrative or executive officer of the governmental entity, may meet in private with the entity’s attorney to discuss pending litigation to which the entity is presently a party before a court or administrative agency, provided that the following conditions are met:
(a) The entity’s attorney shall advise the entity at a public meeting that he or she desires advice concerning the litigation.
(b) The subject matter of the meeting shall be confined to settlement negotiations or strategy sessions related to litigation expenditures.
(c) The entire session shall be recorded by a certified court reporter. The reporter shall record the times of commencement and termination of the session, all discussion and proceedings, the names of all persons present at any time, and the names of all persons speaking. No portion of the session shall be off the record. The court reporter’s notes shall be fully transcribed and filed with the entity’s clerk within a reasonable time after the meeting.
(d) The entity shall give reasonable public notice of the time and date of the attorney-client session and the names of persons who will be attending the session. The session shall commence at an open meeting at which the persons chairing the meeting shall announce the commencement and estimated length of the attorney-client session and the names of the persons attending. At the conclusion of the attorney-client session, the meeting shall be reopened, and the person chairing the meeting shall announce the termination of the session.
(e) The transcript shall be made part of the public record upon conclusion of the litigation.” (e.s.)
Florida courts have held that the Legislature intended a strict construction of section 286.011(8), Florida Statutes.[2] Thus, for example, this office concluded that the above exemption does not apply when no lawsuit has been filed even though the parties involved believe that litigation is inevitable.[3] However, when on-going litigation has been temporarily suspended pursuant to a stipulation for settlement, this office has stated that the litigation has not been concluded for purposes of section 286.011(8), and therefore a transcript of meetings held between the city and its attorney to discuss such litigation may be kept confidential until the litigation is concluded.[4]
It is the primary purpose in construing statutes to ascertain the intent of the Legislature and to give effect to that intent.[5] A review of the legislative history developed during the consideration and passage of CS/HB 491, which became section 286.011(8), Florida Statutes, suggests that the Legislature intended the exemption from disclosure to extend “until the conclusion of the litigation,” that is, to apply through the trial and appeals process. An early version of HB 491 required that the audio tapes made of these meetings would be released to the public at the conclusion of each stage of litigation. CS/HB 491 “changed the requirement that the record of the attorney-client meeting be available to the public at the conclusion of each stage of litigation to require that the transcribed record be made available at the conclusion of all litigation regarding the matter.”[6] Thus, the legislative history indicates that the Legislature intended the exemption to continue through the appeals segment of the litigation.
You suggest that a claim for payment of attorney’s fees may also extend the application of the exemption after a final judgment has been entered, but during the course of the determination of attorney’s fees. You cite to the case of Brown v. City of Lauderhill,[7] a 1995 Fourth District Court of Appeal case, involving a closed-door meeting held pursuant to section 286.011(8), Florida Statutes, between the city attorney and the city commission. The city had filed a claim in the mayor’s name to recover attorney fees incurred in successfully defending the mayor on ethics charges while opponents sought injunctive and declaratory relief, claiming in part that city commissioners had violated the Sunshine Law by meeting in executive session with the city’s attorney regarding the fee claim. The court held that the city was the real party in interest on the fee claim and, therefore, the Sunshine Law authorized the city commission to meet in executive session with the city attorney to discuss the action for attorney’s fees. The discussion of attorney’s fees was not tangential to the litigation; it was the direct subject of the litigation and the minutes of the executive session were closed until resolution of the action for attorney’s fees. I am not aware of a court holding that litigation in which the issues have been resolved and a mandate issued, was still considered to be “pending” pursuant to section 286.011(8), Florida Statutes, for purposes of resolving issues of attorneys’ fees and costs.
Public Records Law
Section 119.071(1)(d)1., Florida Statutes, provides an exemption for certain agency records prepared for litigation or adversarial administrative proceedings:
“A public record that was prepared by an agency attorney (including an attorney employed or retained by the agency or employed or retained by another public officer or agency to protect or represent the interests of the agency having custody of the record) or prepared at the attorney’s express direction, that reflects a mental impression, conclusion, litigation strategy, or legal theory of the attorney or the agency, and that was prepared exclusively for civil or criminal litigation or for adversarial administrative proceedings, or that was prepared in anticipation of imminent civil or criminal litigation or imminent adversarial administrative proceedings, is exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s.
24(a), Art. I of the State Constitution until the conclusion of the litigation or adversarial administrative proceedings. For purposes of capital collateral litigation as set forth in s. 27.7001, the Attorney General’s office is entitled to claim this exemption for those public records prepared for direct appeal as well as for all capital collateral litigation after direct appeal until execution of sentence or imposition of a life sentence.” (e.s.)
The exemption applies only to those records that contain the attorney’s mental impressions, litigation strategy, or legal theory and that are prepared exclusively for litigation or in anticipation of imminent litigation.[8] The courts of this state have recognized that the limited attorney-client exemption in section 119.071(1)(d), Florida Statutes, applies until the conclusion of the litigation or administrative proceedings even though such disclosure could negatively impact the agency’s position in related cases or claims.[9]
In State v. Kokal,[10] the Supreme Court of Florida considered the meaning of the language “conclusion of litigation” in section 119.07(3)(o), Florida Statutes (1985) that is now contained in section 119.071(1)(d), Florida Statutes. Kokal, the post-conviction relief movant, who had been convicted of first-degree murder, moved to compel disclosure of the state attorney’s files relating to his prosecution. The State Attorney argued that several exemptions applied to records of that office relating to Kokal’s case.
Section 119.07(3)(d), Florida Statutes (1985), exempted criminal investigative information so long as it was deemed “active.”[11] The statute provided in part that “criminal intelligence and criminal investigative information shall be considered ‘active’ while such information is directly related to pending prosecutions or appeals .” (e.s.) Such language is currently contained in section 119.011(3)(d), Florida Statutes.
Quoting from the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in Tribune Co. v. Public Records,[12] the Kokal Court stated that “[i]f the legislature had meant to include post-conviction relief proceedings as a basis for an exemption to the Public Records Act it surely would have said so.”[13] Thus, the Court concluded that “[t]he use of the words ‘pending prosecution or appeals’ in section 119.011(3)(d)(2) means ongoing prosecutions or appeals from convictions and sentences which have not become final.”[14]
The Kokal Court held that this rationale would apply equally to the exemption in section 119.07(3)(o), Florida Statutes (1985) (now section 119.071(1)(d), Florida Statutes), stating that “‘the conclusion of litigation’ with respect to a criminal conviction and sentence occurs when that conviction and sentence have become final.”[15]
Subsequently, the Florida Legislature adopted Chapter 95-398, Laws of Florida, which amended the attorney work product exemption to permit attorneys in the Attorney General’s Office to claim the exemption “for those public records prepared for direct appeal as well as for all capital collateral litigation after direct appeal until execution of sentence or imposition of a life sentence.” (e.s.) Thus, it appears that the Legislature recognized that post-conviction relief or appeals were not generally covered within the scope of the attorney work product exemption.
An exemption under this section exists only until the conclusion of the litigation, or for an appeal or post-conviction proceedings in capital collateral litigation, only until the execution of the sentence.[16]
However, the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Wagner v. Orange County,[17] after noting that the language of section 119.071(1)(d), Florida Statutes, does not include reference to post-judgment claims or appeals,[18] held that “the legislature’s use of the phrase ‘conclusion of the litigation’ encompasses post-judgment collection efforts, which include the claim bill filed here.”
The court noted that, at common law, privileges such as attorney-client and work-product are applicable to post-judgment collection efforts and that the Legislature is presumed to know existing law when it enacts a statute.
The court stated that such a construction of the statute “effectuates the purpose and intent of the exemption:”
“[T]he statutory exemption now in effect well accommodates the competing interests in the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship and government in the sunshine under the Public Records Act by providing a temporary exemption from disclosure.”[19]
The Wagner court also concluded that such a construction aligned the exemption in section 119.071(1)(d), Florida Statutes, with that contained in section 768.28(16)(b), Florida Statutes, which is discussed more fully below and was also applicable in Wagner.[20]
It appears that the Wagner court, in an effort to read these statutory provisions relating to work product in a consistent manner and in pari materia, read the “conclusion of the litigation” language to extend through the prosecution of appeals. In addition, an interpretation of the language “conclusion of the litigation” used in both sections 286.011(8) and 119.071 (1)(d), Florida Statutes, in a similar manner would support a reading which extends the exemption through the prosecution of appeals.
Section 768.28(16)(c), Florida Statutes
Your letter also refers to section 768.28(16)(c), Florida Statutes, which provides that portions of meetings and proceedings relating solely to the evaluation of claims or to offers of compromise of claims filed with a risk management program of the state, its agencies and subdivisions, are exempt from section 286.011, Florida Statutes. The statute also exempts the minutes of such meetings and proceedings from public disclosure until the termination of the litigation and settlement of all claims arising out of the same incident.[21]
As noted supra, the court in Wagner v. Orange County concluded that the exemption applied to the claims bill process.[22] This limited exemption, however, applies only to tort claims for which the agency may be liable under section 768.28, Florida Statutes.[23] Moreover, the exemption does not apply to meetings held prior to the filing of a tort claim with the risk management program.[24] Further, a meeting of a city’s risk management committee is exempt from the Government in the Sunshine Law only when the meeting relates solely to the evaluation of a tort claim filed with the risk management program or relates solely to an offer of compromise of a tort claim filed with the risk management program.[25] In contrast to section 286.011(8), Florida Statutes, however, section 768.28 (16), Florida Statutes, does not specify the personnel who are authorized to attend the closed meetings.[26]
Sincerely,
Gerry Hammond
Senior Assistant Attorney General
GH/tsh
______________________________________________________________________
[1] See Neu v. Miami Herald Publishing Company, 462 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 1985) (s. 90.502, Fla. Stat., providing for the confidentiality of attorney-client communications under the Florida Evidence Code, does not create an exemption for attorney-client communications at public meetings; application of the Sunshine Law to such discussions does not usurp Supreme Court’s constitutional authority to regulate the practice of law, nor is it at odds with Florida Bar rules providing for attorney-client confidentiality). Cf. s. 90.502(6), Fla. Stat., stating that a discussion or activity that is not a meeting for purposes of s. 286.011, Fla. Stat., shall not be construed to waive the attorney-client privilege.
[2] See City of Dunnellon v. Aran, 662 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); and see School Board of Duval County v. Florida Publishing Company, 670 So.
2d 99 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
[3] See Ops. Att’y Gen. Fla. 04-35 (2004) and 98-21 (1998). And see Ops.
Att’y Gen. Fla. 06-03 (2006) (exemption not applicable to pre-litigation mediation proceedings) and 09-25 (2009) (town council which received pre-suit notice letter under the Bert J. Harris Act, s. 70.001, Fla. Stat., is not a party to pending litigation for purposes of s. 286.011(8), Fla.
Stat.
[4] Attorney General Opinion 94-64 (1994). And see Op. Att’y Gen. Fla.
94-33 (1994) (a public agency may maintain the confidentiality of a record of a strategy or settlement meeting between a public agency and its attorney until the suit is dismissed with prejudice or the applicable statute of limitations has run). Cf. Op. Att’y Gen. Fla. 96-75 (1996) (disclosure of medical records to city council during closed-door meeting under s. 286.011(8), Fla. Stat., does not affect requirement that transcript of such meeting be made part of public record at conclusion of litigation).
[5] See Ervin v. Peninsular Telephone Company, 53 So. 2d 647 (Fla. 1951) (Supreme Court has duty in construction of statutes to ascertain Legislature’s intention and effectuate it); State v. Webb, 398 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 1981) (legislative intent is the polestar by which the courts must be guided).
[6] See, e.g., House of Representatives Committee on Governmental Operations, Bill Analysis & Economic Impact Statement for CS/HB 491, dated March 3, 1993.
[7] 654 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).
[8] Section 119.071(1)(d)2., Fla. Stat., provides that the exemption continues if the record is released “to another public employee or officer of the same agency or any person consulted by the agency attorney.” An agency relying on this exemption to withhold a public record, however, is required to identify the potential parties to any such criminal or civil litigation or adversarial administrative proceedings. Id. In any civil action in which this exemption is asserted, the public record or part in question must be submitted to the court for an in camera inspection and determination of the applicability of the exemption. See s. 119.07(1)(g), Fla. Stat. And see s. 119.12, Fla. Stat., authorizing the assessment of the reasonable costs of enforcement, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, if the court determines that an agency unlawfully refused to permit a public record to be inspected or copied.
[9] See State v. Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Miami, Inc., 582 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990); Seminole County v. Wood, 512 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987), review denied, 520 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 1988); and Lightbourne v.
McCollum, 969 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1059 (2008) (rejecting a “continuing exemption” claim by the state). And see Tribune Company v. Hardee Memorial Hospital, No. CA-91-370 (Fla. 10th Cir. Ct.
August 19, 1991) (settlement agreement not exempt as attorney work product even though another related case was pending, and agency attorneys feared disclosure would have a detrimental effect upon the agency’s position in the related case).
[10] 562 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 1990).
[11] See s. 119.011(3)(d)2., Fla. Stat. (2012), for the current version of this language.
[12] 493 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986), review denied, 503 So. 2d 327 (Fla. 1987).
[13] 562 So. 2d at 326, quoting Tribune Co. v. Public Records, supra at 483.
[14] 562 So. 2d at 326.
[15] Id. at 327. The attorney work product exemption, unlike the exemption for active criminal investigative and active criminal intelligence investigation, does not expressly refer to appeals.
[16] See Lightbourne v. McCollum, 969 So. 2d 326, 332 (Fla. 2007).
[17] 960 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007).
[18] Compare s. 768.28(16)(b), Fla. Stat.
[19] 960 So.2d at 791-792, citing City of Orlando v. Desjardins, 493 So.
2d 1027, 1029 (Fla. 1986).
[20] 960 So. 2d at 792.
[21] Section 768.28(16)(d), Fla. Stat.
[22] 960 So. 2d at 789.
[23] See Op. Att’y Gen. Fla. 04-35 (2004).
[24] See Op. Att’y Gen. Fla. 92-82 (1992).
[25] See Op. Att’y Gen. Fla. 04-35 (2004).
[26] See Op. Att’y Gen. Fla. 00-20 (2000), advising that personnel of the school district who are involved in the risk management aspect of the tort claim being litigated or settled may attend such meetings without jeopardizing the confidentiality provisions of the statute.
PLEASE DO NOT REPLY TO THIS E-MAIL. THIS ADDRESS IS FOR PROCESSING ONLY.
To contact this office please visit the Attorney General’s website at http://www.myfloridalegal.com and complete the on-line contact form. Again, thank you for contacting the Office of the Florida Attorney General.
Hot off the press:
Palmetto Bay electioneer sues for defamation
By Steve Plunkett All Articles
Daily Business Review December 19, 2012
Call Louis Medina a “paid professional campaigner” or an “experienced canvasser,” but don’t call him a “boletero.”
For allegedly doing that, Medina has sued Palmetto Bay Mayor Shelley Stanczyk, Council members Joan Lindsay and Tim Schaffer, Lindsay’s husband, two other village residents, a website and the John and Jane Doe owners of the website.
The mayor, “acting in her individual capacity and not in her official capacity or under color of authority,” emailed a link to a blog item on pbcheckstherecord.org headlined in part “Boletero comes to Palmetto Bay,” the complaint said. It said a boletero is “a racially and ethnically charged Spanish, pejorative term implying affiliation with the ‘Cuban mafia’ or an individual who engages in illegal and felonious absentee ballot fraud.”
Medina was hired by village counsel candidates John DuBois and Howard Tendrich, who both won, “to get out the vote and persuade undecided voters to vote for his candidate,” the suit said.
The complaint filed by attorney J.B. Harris of Coral Gables on Dec. 6 in Miami-Dade Circuit Court claims negligence, defamation, libel, slander and defamation by implication and seeks damages for mental pain and suffering and loss of standing in the community. Harris reserved the right to seek punitive damages and attorney fees.
“I’m getting an attorney, and I’ll make a response in a timely fashion,” Stanczyk said Tuesday.
Time to continue cleansing the Village of divisive Council-members, we need fresh blood, young, energetic, smart people, there is a rumor circulating that Rainer Schael is considering a run for D3 against Joan , this would indeed be welcomed, Rainer is smart, young businessman who works in the community by doing food drives, organizing the boat parade and heading a committee in the Village in addition to being a straight shooter
You let the cat out of the bag on Rainer. Now watch how fast Shelley and Joan get in boats for the next boat parade. No interest before, but they will do anything to fend off a challenger, even lie. There are no original thoughts in their minds other than where they can find the next photo op. Joan is the next one termer and both she and Shelley are the next incumbents to go down at election. I won’t matter how many semi-secret PACs their friends put together..
Correction: Palmetto Bay’s Mayor often lectures speakers on her MISunderstanding of village laws and procedures. She often stumbles on her words SHEN SHE GOES OFF THE SCRIPT STAFF PREPARES FOR HER and misstates those laws and procedures.
It is obvious that SDM is thoroughly enameled with malapropisms. They’re a shortcut to the absurd. Yogi Berra may be the current all-time champ, but Mayor Stanczyk is proving herself to be no slouch. Reports are that she is rapidly gaining in the polls. You know what SDM? “You can observe a lot just by watching.”
SDM Note: Enameled?
Enameled was the hidden malapropism. Congratulations you eagled eyed curmudgeon.
I would like to wish everyone a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year!
Rainer would be a great choice to replace Joan in District 3. But then again I could shave a monkey and have it run for Seat 3 and that would be better.
But seriously Rainer is a good guy and we should all get behind him for seat 3.
Just FYI. Criminal defense lawyer Ben Kuehne has entered an appearance on behalf or Stanczyk, Lindsay, Templer, Triana and Pasterella in the suits brought by Araiza and Medina. He’s the attorney who represents or represented Lindsay in the destruction of evidence matter brought in the Palmer suit relating to the missing hard drive and emails. Query whether Shelley and Joan are dipping into public funds to pay his fees. Obviously, no one defendant can afford him.
I am sure that this bunch has Ben Kuehne on retainer as well as on speed dial. Kuehne knows a repeat client when he sees one. Someone should make a public records request for how much the village insurance policy paid for Ben Kuehne to represent Joan Lindsay in her ethics complaint.
Interesting to see that they got a real attorney to represent them.
I guess Tucker Gibbs is no longer accepting payment in math tutoring.
I didn’t see Tim Schaffer being included in that group represented by Kuehne. I guess they left Tim out in the cold. Not a surprise. They do that best. Wait till one of the defendants rolls over on Jerry as the mastermind. This could get fun.
I want to wish everyone a Merry Christmas and a prosperous New Year. May peace once again retun to Palmetto Bay in 2013.
The lawsuits are clearly against the elected officials in their individual capacities so it is very interesting that Ben Kuehne is representing them. He is a very high paid lawyer. Inquiring minds woud like to know whether the elected officials are actually paying this lawyer or if they are receiving undeclared gifts in the form of attorney services either gratis or at a heavily discounted rate (a rate that is not available to mere mortals like you or me). Taking the theoretical scenarios one step further, if an ethics complaint arose out of the allegation that the civil attorney representation was a non-declared gift, could Ben Kuehne then represent these same officials in the ethics matter?
Lots of speculation there…one can always hire a lawyer with a fixed fee arrangement to get one to a certain point. More interesting to watch is whether over time the attorney and/or his firm represent entities related to the elected officials or for the village as outside counsel. On the other hand, this particular lawyer is known for representing elected officials so it is not unusual for any person to seek out and hire the best person available in that practice area.
Ben is a highly skilled lawyer (and a really nice guy), but this kind of case is not really his bailiwick. He practices more in the criminal area than he does in the civil arena.
But Jerry, the Mayor and rest of them may need a crimianl defence attorney when all is said and done.
Funny how they call everyone else names when they are really the source of all the turmoil. Shelley and Joan really need to take a good long look in the mirror and try their best to turn over a new leaf for 2013.
They are communist SDM! Communist I say!
Looking in the mirror would only reveal the monsters within. That’s why they have no mirrors in their homes, or their cars, which makes driving difficult.
No mirrors? Why would they have mirrors? They do not have reflections, therefore mirrors are of no use to them.